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Due to a constantly growing competition among organizations and higher customer expecta-
tions, in the course of the last decades companies started to realize the need for supply 
chain collaboration (SCC). However, setting up a coalition is often challenging for collabora-
tive parties. One major challenge for the implementation and success of a collaboration is 
a fair allocation method, which is accepted by and satisfies all collaborative parties. Although 
researchers already outlined the importance of the parties’ acceptance of the gain sharing 
method, until now the actual acceptance levels of gain sharing methods have not been in-
vestigated. This paper fills this gap by investigating the acceptance levels of selected gain 
sharing methods in vertical three-echelon SCCs in the Dutch fast moving consumer goods 
(FMCG) industry. In addition, the influence of behavioural decision-making aspects on the ac-
ceptance of allocation methods is observed in order to explain the cause of the acceptance 
or rejection of the gain sharing method. Results indicate that the acceptance of a gain shar-
ing method depends on the information availability and cognitive biases. Furthermore, due 
to a different influence of available information and varying cognitive biases, no allocation 
method is accepted by all collaborative parties. Practical implications include to provide each 
party individually all relevant information to increase the parties’ acceptance and to apply 
debiasing techniques to make the decisions more predictable.
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1. introDuCtion
In the course of the last decades companies 
started to realize the benefits of setting up 
a supply chain collaboration (SCC). Various 
challenges such as a constantly growing com­
petition among organizations and higher 
customer expectations forced companies to 
look outside their organizational boundaries 
to search for parties with whom they can 
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collaborate [Lambert, Emmelhainz, Gard ner, 
1996; Simatupang, Sridharan, 2002; Cao, 
Zhang, 2011; Tan, 2002]. Nowadays, SCC is 
a widely discussed topic which can be defined 
as “two or more independent companies work 
jointly to plan and execute [...] operations 
with greater success than when acting in 
isolation” [Simatupang, Sridharan, 2002]. 
The greater success, which can be achieved 
through SCCs, has been outlined by several 
researchers such as [Lambert, Emmelhainz, 
Gardner, 1996; Cao, Zhang, 2011]. Examples 
are cost reduction reduction [Stank, Keller, 
Daugherty, 2001; Defryn, Vanovermeire, Sö­
rensen, 2016], improved service performance 
and cycle time reduction [Stank, Keller, Dau­
gherty, 2001].
Besides many possible competitive advan­
tages, SCCs bring along challenges. Ac­
cording to [Cruijssen, Cools, Dullaert, 2007; 
Dahl, Derigs, 2011] as well as [Leng, Parlar, 
2009], one main challenge for the imple­
mentation and the success of SCCs is the 
division of the coalition gain among the col­
laborative parties. If one party is not satis­
fied with its allocated share or has the feel­
ing that it does not receive a fair portion 
of the coalition gain, future SCCs are less 
likely to occur [Jap, 2001].
In order to solve this problem, research­
ers developed different gain sharing methods 
to allocate the coalition gain among the col­
laborative parties. The general idea of these 
allocation methods is to distribute the gains 
in such a way that everyone is satisfied to 
ensure the establishment and sustainability 
as well as to realize the potential of the SCC 
[Liu, Wu, Xu, 2010]. Until now several al­
location methods ranging from straightfor­
ward rules of thumbs to game theory­based 
methods have been proposed [Vanovermeire, 
Vercruysse, Sörensen, 2014]. The straight­
forward rules of thumbs are preferred in 
practice due to the fact that game­theoret­
ical allocation methods are more difficult to 
understand, more complicated to compute 
and more data are required [Leng, Parlar, 
2009]. One example for a straightforward 
rule of thumb is the equal allocation of the 
coalition gain among the parties [Jap, 2001]. 
Next to the equal allocation, methods where 
the weight for each party is determined based 
on e. g. the volume (i. e. the number of pal­
lets, the total weight...) are often used in 
practice. Another possibility is to determine 
the weight according to the stand­alone costs 
[Vanovermeire, Vercruysse, Sörensen, 2014].
The allocation of the coalition gain clear­
ly matches bargaining in a cooperative game. 
In the bargaining game a distribution prob­
lem for a fixed sum of resources has to be 
solved [Güth, Schmittberger, Schwarze, 
1982; Suh, Wen, 2003]. As a result, sev­
eral cooperative game theoretical based al­
location methods exist. One example is a well­
known gain sharing method based on the 
foundation of cooperative game theory is 
the Shapley value, introduced by [Shapley, 
1953]. Another example is the more complex 
cooperative game theoretic sharing mecha­
nism called the nucleolus, introduced by 
[Schmeidler, 1969]. One more example is 
suggested in [Tijs, Driessen, 1986]. In their 
article, the researchers discuss an allocation 
method that first divides the costs in a sep­
arable and non­separable part. The separable 
part is directly linked and assigned to a spe­
cific party. The remaining costs, the non­
separable part, have to be divided among 
the parties. Besides, paper [Tijs, Driessen, 
1986] mentions different ways of how the 
non­separable part of the costs can be al­
located. Authors discuss the equal charge 
method (ECM), the alternative cost avoided 
method (ACAM) and the separable cost re­
maining benefits (SCRB), as well as intro­
duce a new method, the cost gap method 
(CGM). Furthermore, [Frisk et al., 2010] 
introduce the equal profit method (EPM), 
where the maximum difference between the 
relative savings of two parties is minimized.
As each allocation method has its own 
advantages as well as disadvantages, if re­
mains ambiguous which gain sharing meth­
od should be applied in a SCC compromised 
of parties with different objectives. However, 
as already outlined by [Cruijssen, Cools, 
Dullaert, 2007; Dahl, Derigs, 2011] along 
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with [Leng, Parlar, 2009] the acceptance of 
a gain sharing method by all parties is nec­
essary for the implementation and the suc­
cess of a SCC. This is also stressed by sev­
eral statements from the industry. For in­
stance, manufacturers, logistics service 
providers as well as retailers from the Dutch 
fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) indus­
try outlined the acceptance as well as satis­
faction with the received gain is a major 
barrier for the implementation and the suc­
cess of the collaboration. One retailer men­
tioned that he is “just willing to collaborate 
if there are real monetary gains for him” 
(interview with one retailer, 28.04.2015). 
In addition, another retailer pointed out that 
collaborations between the supply chain par­
ties are only possible if all involved parties 
have the feeling of receiving a fair share of 
the total gain (interview with one retailer, 
29.04.2015). Although the importance of 
the acceptance of the allocated gain and 
therefore the gain sharing method itself for 
the implementation and the sustainability 
of a SCC has been outlined in theory as well 
as practice, until now no researcher has in­
vestigated the acceptance levels of different 
gain sharing methods.
This paper tries to fill this gap and extends 
the work by [Cruijssen, Cools, Dullaert, 2007] 
and [Leng, Parlar, 2009] by investigating 
the parties’ acceptance levels of selected gain 
sharing methods in vertical three­echelon 
SCCs between one manufacturer, one logis­
tics service provider (LSP) and one retailer 
in the Dutch FMCG industry. The FMCG 
industry is chosen since for parties in this 
industry SCCs are very important in order 
to survive on the market [de Kok, van Dalen, 
van Hillegersberg, 2015]. As a result, to 
ensure sustainable SCCs in the FMCG indus­
try all collaborative parties have to be satis­
fied with and accept the assigned gain share.
In addition, the influence of behavioural 
decision­making aspects on the acceptance 
levels of these gain sharing methods is ex­
amined in order to investigate the cause of 
the acceptance or rejection of the gain shar­
ing method. Special attention is paid to two 
behavioural decision­making aspects: infor­
mation availability and cognitive biases. The 
focus is firstly on information availability 
since in the case studies introduced by [Jung, 
Peeters, Vredeveld, 2017] and also in a pre­
liminary qualitative study with 20 companies 
of the Dutch FMCG industry (see Appendix 
A) a connection between the access of infor­
mation and the gain sharing has been iden­
tified.
Secondly, cognitive biases are considered 
due to their close connection to information 
availability. Parties rely on cognitive biases 
if incomplete information are provided [Ster­
man, 1989]. The incorporation of behavioural 
research literature within supply chain man­
agement (SCM) literature, is another re­
search contribution of this paper. For a long 
time, the predominant assumption in eco­
nomics was that human beings are rational 
thinking agents, which implies that deci­
sions are made in a rational and consistent 
way [Sterman, 1989]. However, human be­
ings are bounded due to limitations in avail­
able time, information and cognitive capa­
bilities [Simon, 1979]. They tend to rely on 
heuristics or cognitive biases to deal with 
complex problems [Schenk, 2011].
Until now, a wide range of cognitive bi­
ases have been identified. Among these is 
the recency bias, where people tend to put 
more weight on the latest information they 
get [Hallowell, Gambatese, 2010]. Another 
example is the so­called salience bias, where 
human beings tend to focus on the most 
easily­recognizable items or information of 
a concept and ignore the once which are not 
that visible [Schenk, 2011]. The choice­
supportive bias is a bias, where people tend 
to feel positive about something they choose, 
even if the choice has a flaw [Mather, John­
son, 2000]. As a final example, the fram­
ing effect bias is named. According to [De 
Martino et al., 2006], human beings are re­
markable vulnerable to the manner in which 
the options are presented, which is the so­
called framing effect. Therefore, when fac­
ing a consequentially identical decision 
problem people’s decisions may be contrary 
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depending on how the options are presented; 
in a positive, in terms of gains, or in a neg­
ative, in terms of losses, “frame”. Until now, 
limited research has been published in the 
logistics and supply chain management lit­
erature dealing with the influence of human 
behaviour, judgment and decision­making. 
However, to ensure practical validity it is 
necessary to incorporate behavioural re­
search in studies [Tokar, 2010]. This is 
stressed by [Mantel, Tatikonda, Liao, 2006] 
who outline the increased understanding of 
decisions made in SCM by integrating be­
havioural decision­making literature with 
SCM literature.
In this paper the acceptance of selected 
gain sharing methods as well as the influ­
ence of behavioural aspects on the acceptance 
levels of these allocation methods is inves­
tigated through a quantitative case study 
approach. This approach shows similarities 
but also differences compared to the bar­
gaining game approach introduced in the 
literature. The intention of a bargaining 
game is the same as for the chosen approach, 
which is to solve a distribution problem for 
a fixed sum of resources [Güth, Schmitt­
berger, Schwarze, 1982; Suh, Wen, 2003]. 
However, in the presented research the goal 
is clearly on observing the acceptance levels 
of the different gain sharing methods and 
not the sharing process itself, which is the 
case in the bargaining game. Another dif­
ference is that in bargaining games perfect 
information are assumed [Güth, Schmitt­
berger, Schwarze, 1982], whereas in the 
chosen approach the amount of information 
a party is receiving is changing and no as­
sumption is made about having the perfect 
information. Furthermore, the players can 
make binding agreements before entering 
the game in a bargaining game [Nash, 1953] 
which is not the case in the chosen approach. 
To conclude this comparison, it can be out­
lined that the intention to distribute a gain 
is the same for both approaches, but that 
the assumptions and settings are different.
The remainder of the paper is structured 
as follows. The research methodology is out­
lined in Section 2. Next, in Section 3, the 
statistical analysis and the results are pre­
sented, followed by a discussion as well as 
directions for further research in Section 4. 
The paper concludes with an outline for 
practical as well as theoretical implications 
in Section 5.
2. researCh proCeDure
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no 
researcher investigated the acceptance lev­
els of gain sharing methods in practice. 
Therefore, this research is exploratory and 
the best­suited approach is a case study ap­
proach [Yin, 2013], more precisely a quan­
titative case study approach is used. By 
means of the case study the following ques­
tions will be examined:
1. What are the acceptance levels of gain 
sharing methods in the Dutch FMCG in­
dustry?
a. What are the manufacturers’ accep­
tance levels of gain sharing methods?
b. What are the LSPs’ acceptance levels 
of gain sharing methods?
c. What are the retailers’ acceptance lev­
els of gain sharing methods?
2. What is the influence of behavioural de­
cision­making aspects on the acceptance 
levels of gain sharing methods in the 
Dutch FMCG industry?
a. What is the influence of information 
availability on the acceptance levels 
of gain sharing methods?
b. What is the influence of cognitive bi­
ases on the acceptance levels of gain 
sharing methods?
The research procedure is divided into four 
steps. In Table 1, the main aspects for each 
step are outlined.
2.1. Variable selection
In order to answer the outlined questions, 
the influence of three aspects — gain shar­
ing method, information availability and 
perspective — on the acceptance of selected 
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gain sharing methods is investigated. These 
aspects are outlined in detail in the next 
sections.
2.1.1. Gain sharing method
First, the influence of the gain sharing 
method, which represents the first variable, 
is investigated. The gain sharing method 
determines the gain which is assigned to 
each party. As these differ among the gain 
sharing methods, the level of acceptance of 
the allocation methods are most likely dif­
ferent which might uncover possible cogni­
tive biases. In this research, the focus is on 
four gain sharing methods: the Shapley va­
lue, the Nucleolus and two methods based 
on separable and non­separable costs, the 
weighted charge method (WCM) and the 
equal charge method (ECM). For the WCM 
two weights are chosen. Therefore, in total 
five gain sharing methods are investigated. 
The first two allocation methods are well­
known game­theoretical based methods and 
the most preferred methods in theory [Mou­
lin, 1988]. The last two respectively three 
allocation methods are most similar to what 
is already used in practice, which follows 
from the preliminary study (Appendix A).
Shapley value. For the Shapley value the 
formation of the grand­coalition N, which 
includes every party of the SCC, can be seen 
as a sequential process, where the parties 
Table 1
research procedure
step procedure Comments reference
Step 1 Variable 
selection
Independent variables
Gain sharing method (Nucleolus, Shapley value, Weighted charge 
method — Power/Initiator, Equal charge method)
Information availability (Phase 1, Phase 2, Phase 3)
Perspective (Manufacturer, LSP, Retailer)
dependent variable
Acceptance
Section 3.1
Step 2 Data 
collection
Participants evaluate whether to accept or reject a certain gain share  
for each of the five gain sharing methods in each of the three phases
Only outcomes (ordered from the lowest to the highest) are presented,  
it is not mentioned which method is applied
Section 3.2
Step 3 Popu la­
tion and 
sample 
selection
Population
Companies from the Dutch FMCG industry and participants  
in a specific logistics competition
sample size
4 manufacturers, 4 LSPs, 4 retailers
Section 3.3
Step 4 Data 
analysis
research question
What are the acceptance levels of different gain sharing methods and 
what is the influence of different behavioural decision­making aspects 
on the acceptance levels of these allocation methods?
Analytical tool
Logistic regression with penalized maximum likelihood estimation
Independent variables
Gain sharing method (Method): Categorical variable; Baseline: 
Nucleolus
Information availability (Phase): Categorical variable; Baseline: 
Phase 1
Perspective (Type): Categorical variable, Baseline: Manufacturer
dependent Variable
Acceptance: Binary variable
Section 3.4
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of the SCC enter one by one. For every par­
ty i, the value is defined as the average mar­
ginal contribution of the party to every 
possible sub­coalition S of the grand­co­
alition containing this party. The Shapley 
value is based on the four axioms formu­
lated by [Shapley, 1953] and can be com­
puted by:
( )
( ) ( )( )
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− −
= ×
× −
∑
\
! 1 !
!
,
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S N i
S N S
x
N
c S i c S
 (1)
where xi — the allocated gain for party i; 
N — the grand­coalition (all parties includ­
ed); S — a sub­coalition; |N |, |S | — the 
number of parties in a grand­coalition and 
sub­coalition, respectively; c(S) — the costs 
of sub­coalition S.
Nucleolus. The nucleolus [Schmeidler, 
1969] is based on the idea to minimize the 
maximum excess. The excess is the gain the 
parties in a sub­coalition S obtain if they 
exit the grand­coalition N. For a sub­coali­
tion S given an allocation x the excess is 
denoted as:
( ) ( )
∈
= − ∑, i
i S
e x S c S x , (2)
where e(x, S) — the excess for a sub­coalition 
S given an allocation x; S — a sub­coalition; 
xi — the allocated gain for party i; c(S)  — 
the costs of the sub­coalition S.
Weighted charge method. The WCM is 
based on the idea of [Tijs, Driessen, 1986] 
that the costs are at first split in a sepa­
rable (mi = c(N) – c(N \i)) and a non­separa­
ble part (c(N ) – Σjmj). The non­separable 
part is divided among the parties according 
to some specific weight wi. The allocation 
portion for a party i is then computed as 
follows:
( )( )= + − ⋅∑   i i j ijx m c N m w , (3)
where xi — the allocated gain for party i; 
mi, mj — the separable part of the gain for 
party i and j, respectively; N — the grand­
coalition (all parties included); c(N) — the 
costs of the grand­coalition N; wi — spe­
cific weight for party i.
Based on the preliminary study (see Ap­
pendix A) two different kinds of weights 
have been identified, one based on the pow-
er position and one based on the initiator. 
In the Dutch FMCG industry the retailer is 
the most powerful party. Therefore, the 
highest weight with wr = 0.5 is assigned to 
the retailer. In comparison to the manufac­
turer the logistics service provider is more 
powerful therefore, a weight of wl = 0.3 is 
assigned to the LSP and the rest wm = 0.2 
is assigned to the manufacturer. Further­
more, in the Dutch FMCG industry often 
the LSP initiates to start the SCC. Therefore, 
the highest weight with wl = 0.4 is assigned 
to the LSP. The rest is equally split among 
the manufacturer and the retailer.
Equal charge method. The ECM is also 
based on the idea of [Tijs, Driessen, 1986]. 
In contrast to the WCM, the non­separable 
part is equally distributed among the par­
ties. Therefore, the total amount allocated 
to each party i is:
( ) −
= +
∑  j
j
i i
c N m
x m
N
, (4)
where xi — the allocated gain for party i; 
mi, mj — the separable part of the gain for 
party i and j, respectively; N — the grand­
coalition (all parties included); |N| — the num­
ber of parties in a grand­coalition; c(N) — the 
costs of the grand­coalition N.
2.1.2. Information availability
Second, the influence of the information 
availability, which represents the second 
variable, is examined. This behavioural de­
cision­making aspect refers to the limitation 
of available information outlined by [Simon, 
1979] in the context of bounded rationality. 
Human beings make their decisions based 
on cognitive biases when available informa­
tion is limited [Sterman, 1989]. In order to 
investigate the influence of information 
availability, three different phases are de­
veloped, where the amount of information 
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increases with each phase. In the first phase, 
the participants only receive the informa­
tion about their own financial consequences. 
This includes information about their ex­
pected benefits, the costs related to the SCC 
and the resulting expected profit, which is 
equal to the contribution they make to the 
coalition gain, see Table 2. Moreover, they 
receive the information about the gain they 
will receive according to each of the five 
gain sharing methods, see Table 3. In the 
second phase, the participants also receive 
the information about the financial conse­
quences of their coalition partners. Finally, 
in the last phase, market information for 
each collaborative party is included. Here 
information about the market share, the 
products and the importance of a collabora­
tion with the party is included, see Fig. 1.
2.1.3. Perspective
Third, the influence of the perspective, 
which represents the third variable, is in­
vestigated. The case study focuses on a ver­
tical SCC between one manufacturer, one 
LSP and one retailer. Different collabora­
tive parties have different information and 
therefore, most likely show various cogni­
tive biases [Sterman, 1989].
2.2. Data collection
The data of the quantitative case study 
have been collected using online surveys. 
The strong methodology control is the main 
reason to use an online survey. In an online 
survey the order of the questions, the com­
pleteness of the answers and the filtering 
can be controlled by the researcher [Evans, 
Table 2
information about the financial consequences after a five-year supply chain collaboration
manufacturer logistics service provider retailer
Benefits €80 000 €50 000 €250 000
Costs €85 000 €10 000  €80 000
Profits  –€5000 €40 000 €170 000
Table 3
gain assigned to the different parties according to the gain sharing methods
manufacturer logistics service provider retailer
Nucleolus   €4333.33 €55 333.33 €145 333.33
Shapley €36 333.33 €61 833.33 €106 833.33
WCM­Power €41 000.00 €61 500.00 €102 500.00
WCM­Initiator €61 500.00 €82 000.00  €61 500.00
ECM €68 333.33 €68 333.33 €68 333.33
Fig. 1. Market information for each party
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Mathur, 2005]. The participants are asked 
in each phase of information availability 
and for each gain sharing method to eval­
uate whether they would accept or reject 
the assigned gain. Thereby, the question 
order from Phase 1 to Phase 3 is necessary 
in order to observe the influence of avail­
able information. The participants only see 
the outcomes of the gain sharing method 
but they do not know which method is ap­
plied. Therefore, the acceptance of the al­
location method is examined through the 
acceptance of the specific gain. The as­
signed gain shares are ranked from the 
lowest to the highest in order to prevent 
parties rejecting a gain share which is low­
er than one before.
Another important advantage of the on­
line survey is that participants cannot look 
ahead like in a mail survey. However, in 
such a situation the questionnaire might 
appear to have an endless number of ques­
tions which might keep a respondent from 
continuing the online survey [Evans, Ma­
thur, 2005]. In order to prevent this, a graph­
ical progress indicator is used. The prede­
termined order and the prevention of look­
ing ahead to later questions reduce the 
survey bias. Moreover, through the use of 
an online survey and not a personal survey 
or a telephone survey the so­called inter­
view bias is avoided which can always occur 
when there is a personal contact between 
the interviewer and the respondent [Evans, 
Mathur, 2005]. The goal of the online sur­
vey is to among others observe cognitive 
biases, therefore, the prevention of biases 
resulting out of the surveys is essential. 
Furthermore, split samples are used. The 
online surveys differ per collaborative par­
ty, according to [Evans, Mathur, 2005] “on­
line surveys are particularly effective when 
multiple samples are involved”.
The online surveys are distributed through 
a link to the survey URLs in an e­mail. 
Reminders are sent out every week to 
achieve a higher response rate. An example 
of the online survey can be found in Ap­
pendix B.
2.3. population and sample size 
selection
The online surveys are conducted with com­
panies from the Dutch FMCG industry. This 
industry is selected due to the importance 
of SCCs for this industry [de Kok, van Da­
len, van Hillegersberg, 2015]. In the FMCG 
industry it is necessary for parties to col­
laborate with their supply chain partners. 
To ensure sustainable SCCs, all parties have 
to be satisfied with and accept their assigned 
gain share. The participants are selected 
from a population of 26 companies partici­
pating in a logistic competition in the Ne­
therlands with the goal to reduce the truck 
cycle time at the retailer distribution centre 
through SCCs. The sample size is 12 includ­
ing four manufacturers, four LSPs and four 
retailers. The online surveys were conduct­
ed with supply chain or logistics managers 
of the companies due to their experiences 
and expertise in SCC.
2.4. Data analysis
To analyse the outlined research questions 
a logistic regression is performed [Hosmer, 
Lemeshow, Sturdivant, 2013]. In order to 
use the logistic regression some data prep­
arations have to be made. The dependent 
variable is a binary variable getting a value 
equal to 1, if the gain is accepted and 0, 
otherwise. The three independent variables 
are all categorical variables. The gain shar­
ing method variable is coded as Nucleolus, 
Shapley, WCM-Power, WCM-Initiator and 
ECM. Taken the Nucleolus as a baseline, 
the gain sharing variable is represented by 
four binaries. To represent the five gain 
sharing methods only four design variables 
are necessary due to an intercept used in 
the model [Hosmer, Lemeshow, Sturdivant, 
2013]. Information availability is repre­
sented by two variables with Phase 1 des­
ignated as the reference phase. The perspec­
tive is also represented by two variables 
and the Manufacturer is taken as the base­
line.
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Problems with the logistic regression oc­
curred as a consequence of the data pattern 
known as quasi­complete separation. Quasi­
complete separation occurs if the dependent 
variable of an independent dummy variable 
is always either equal to 1 or to 0. As a con­
sequence, the maximum likelihood estimate 
does not exist. This problem often occurs if 
a small sample size is used [Allison, 2008]. 
Therefore, a logistic regression with penal­
ized maximum likelihood estimation is used. 
The penalized maximum likelihood estima­
tion method has been proposed by [Firth, 
1993] to reduce the bias in maximum like­
lihood estimates. [Heinze, Schemper, 2002] 
show that this method provides a solution 
for the quasi­complete separation problem. 
The basic idea of the penalized maximum 
likelihood estimation method is to introduce 
a modified score function which removes the 
bias of the maximum likelihood estimates 
of the coefficients [Firth, 1993]. For a more 
elaborate explanation of this method, the 
reader is referred to [Firth, 1993; Heinze, 
Schemper, 2002].
The logistic regressions are performed 
using R (version 3.3.2), using the package 
logistf. To perform the logistic regression 
with maximum likelihood estimation. The 
package logistf uses as a default the penal­
ized log likelihood ratio test. As this meth­
od is also recommended by [Heinze, Schem­
per, 2002] for the logistic regression with 
maximum likelihood estimation, the penal­
ized log likelihood ratio test is used.
The data analysis starts with a multicol­
linearity test. Based on the results of the 
multicollinearity tests the logistic regres­
sions are performed. At first, the influence 
of all independent variables on the accep­
tance levels of the selected gain sharing 
methods is investigated. This is followed by 
the analysis of the influence of behavioural 
aspects on the acceptance level of each par­
ty separately to among others examine the 
questions (1a) to (1c). Therefore, three ad­
ditional logistic regressions, one for the 
manufacturers, one for the LSPs and one 
for the retailers, are performed. Through 
an extensive comparison between the logis­
tic regressions, differences in the parties’ 
acceptance levels and the influence of be­
havioural aspects are identified. In Fig. 2, 
an overview of the procedure of the data 
analysis is presented.
3. statistiCal analysis  
anD results
In the following the statistical analysis and 
the results are presented. At first, the re­
sults for the multicollinearity test are out­
lined. This is followed by the outcomes of 
the logistic regression where the influence 
of all independent variables on the accep­
tance levels is observed. Next, the results 
for each party separately are shown. In the 
remainder of this paper, a significance level 
of 5% is taken as the standard significance 
level.
3.1. multicollinearity
One common problem when using multiple 
independent variables in a logistic regres­
sion is the occurrence of correlation among 
independent variables. When two indepen­
dent variables are highly correlated, the 
problem known as multicollinearity occurs. 
Multicollinearity can seriously distort the 
interpretation of the model [Greene, 2003]. 
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix of the 
independent variables used in the logistic 
regression. All correlation coefficients have 
small values (≤ 0.5) indicating no problems 
with multicollinearity. Therefore, all inde­
pendent variables are included in the logis­
tic regressions. 
3.2. regression
In this section, the acceptance levels of the 
gain sharing methods are investigated. In 
Fig. 3, the acceptance levels of the three 
parties over all gain sharing methods and 
phases are displayed. The overall business 
practitioners’ acceptance level is 54.44%. 
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Fig. 2. Procedure of the data analysis
Table 4
Correlation matrix
Variable phase 1
phase 
2
phase 
3 nucleolus shapley
WCm-
power
WCm-
initiator eCm
manu-
facturer lsp retailer
Phase 1 1.00 –0.50 –0.50 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00
Phase 2  1.00 –0.50 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00
Phase 3  1.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00
Nucleolus  1.00 –0.25 –0.25 –0.25 –0.25 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00
Shapley  1.00 –0.25 –0.25 –0.25 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00
WCM­Power  1.00 –0.25 –0.25 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00
WCM­Initiator  1.00 –0.25 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00
ECM  1.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00
Manufacturer  1.00 –0.50 –0.50
LSP  1.00 –0.50
Retailer  1.00
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Looking at each party individually, the LSPs 
show the highest level of acceptance and 
the retailers the lowest. Moreover, the coef­
ficient of the LSPs is positive. There fore, 
in comparison to the manufacturers, the 
LSPs have a significantly higher level of 
acceptance at a 1% significance level. On 
the contrary, the retailers show a negative 
coefficient indicating a significantly lower 
acceptance level in comparison to the man­
ufacturers even at a 1% significance level.
In Fig. 4, the acceptance levels of each of 
the five gain sharing methods in each phase 
are displayed. For the collaborative parties 
the Nucleolus reveals the smallest level of 
acceptance with on average 44.44% over 
three phases. This is also observed by the 
logistic regression, see Table 5. All allocation 
methods show a positive coefficient indicat­
ing that compared to the Nucleolus they have 
a higher level of acceptance. However, only 
the ECM shows a significant increase in the 
acceptance levels. Taken the phases into ac­
count, no significant difference between the 
phases is observed, see Table 5.
3.3. regression manufacturer
In Fig. 5, the manufacturers’ acceptance lev­
els of the five gain sharing methods in each 
phase are displayed. For the manufacturers, 
the overall level of acceptance is 55%. Huge 
differences can be observed in the acceptance 
levels between the methods. Moreover, an 
increase in the acceptance from the Nucleo­
lus to the ECM is noticeable. Therefore, the 
Nucleolus is the least accepted method with 
a level of acceptance of 8.33%, averaged over 
the three phases. On the contrary, the most 
accepted method with an acceptance level of 
100% is the ECM. In Table 6, the results of 
the logistic regression are presented. A sig­
nificant increase in the acceptance levels of 
the gain sharing methods compared to the 
Nucleolus is identified. Furthermore, a sig­
nificant influence of the information avail­
ability on the acceptance levels is observed. 
Compared to Phase 1, the acceptance levels 
of Phase 2 and Phase 3 are significantly 
lower, with the lowest level of acceptance in 
Phase 2.
Fig. 3. Acceptance levels of each collaborative party
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Fig. 4. Acceptance levels of the five different gain sharing method and the three different phases
Table 5
logistic regression output for all collaborative parties
Coefficient significance level
Intercept –0.242
  (0.517)
0.633
Shapley   0.474
  (0.571)
0.399
WCM­Power   0.790
  (0.575)
0.161
WCM­Initiator   0.317
  (0.570)
0.574
ECM   1.274
  (0.588)
0.025
Phase 2 –0.287
  (0.444)
0.512
Phase 3 –0.096
  (0.444)
0.827
LSP   1.769
  (0.472)
0.000
Retailer –1.564
  (0.421)
0.000
χ2 = 41.388, df = 6, p­value = 0.000
N o t e: standard errors are in parentheses; statistics marked in bold indicate a significance of the correspond­
ing independent variables.
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Fig. 5. Acceptance levels of the five different gain sharing method and the three different phases 
for the manufacturers
Table 6
logistic regression output for the manufacturers
Coefficient significance level
Intercept –0.944
  (1.000)
0.292
Shapley   2.355
  (1.289)
0.037
WCM­Power   3.239
  (1.336)
0.003
WCM­Initiator   3.665
  (1.362)
0.001
ECM   6.517
  (1.953)
0.000
Phase 2 –3.152
  (1.073)
0.000
Phase 3 –2.171
  (1.009)
0.015
χ2 = 69.965, df = 6, p­value = 0.000
N o t e: standard errors are in parentheses; statistics marked in bold indicate a significance of the correspond­
ing independent variables.
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Fig. 6. Acceptance levels of the five different gain sharing method and the three different phases 
for the LSPs
3.4. regression lsp
In Fig. 6, the LSPs’ acceptance levels of the 
five gain sharing methods in each phase are 
displayed. The LSPs show a high overall ac­
ceptance level of 88.33% and for each al­
location method acceptance levels of 75%, 
averaged over the three phases, and higher 
are identified. Furthermore, differences in 
the acceptance levels of the phases are ob­
served for the LSPs. A significant influence 
of the information availability on the ac­
ceptance levels is identified at a 10% sig­
nificance level, see Table 7. In addition, 
a positive influence of the information avail­
ability on the acceptance levels can be iden­
tified for the business practitioners.
3.5. regression retailer
In Fig. 7, the retailers’ acceptance levels of 
the five gain sharing methods in each phase 
are displayed. In total, the retailers have a low 
level of acceptance. They show a decrease in 
the acceptance from the Nu cleolus to the 
ECM, with the lowest level of acceptance of 
the WCM­Initiator which is not accepted at 
all. The highest acceptance level is assigned 
to the Nucleolus with on avarage 41.67% over 
the three phases. Furthermore, a significant 
decrease in the acceptance compared to the 
Nucleolus is identified for the WCM­Initiator 
and the ECM at a 10% significance level, see 
Table 8. In total, no significant influence of 
the phases is observed (Table 8).
4. DisCussion  
anD further researCh
4.1. result discussion
The case studies revealed two main findings. 
First, the parties’ acceptance of the gain 
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Table 7
logistic regression output for the lsps
Coefficient significance level
Intercept 0.296
(0.854)
0.719
Shapley 0.710
(1.236)
0.553
WCM­Power 0.710
(1.236)
0.553
WCM­Initiator 0.000
(1.121)
1.000
ECM 0.710
(1.236)
0.553
Phase 2 2.757
(1.370)
0.010
Phase 3 1.644
(0.924)
0.050
χ2 = 11.722, df = 6, p­value = 0.000
N o t e: standard errors are in parentheses; statistics marked in bold indicate a significance of the correspond­
ing independent variables.
Fig. 7. Acceptance levels of the five different gain sharing method and the three different phases 
for the retailers
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sharing method is influenced by available 
information and cognitive biases. Second, 
each party is differently influenced by the 
information availability and different par­
ties reveal various cognitive biases. As a re­
sult of the different influence of information 
availability and varying cognitive biases, no 
allocation method is accepted by all collab­
orative parties. In the following for each 
party the influence of available information 
and cognitive biases on the acceptance deci­
sion is outlined. In addition, for each party 
separately and for all participants together, 
the preferred gain sharing method, which 
result from the influence of the behavioural 
aspects, is identified.
Results show the significant influence of 
the information availability for the manu­
facturers and the LSPs. However, the man­
ufacturers are negatively influenced by the 
information availability, whereas the LSPs 
in the Dutch FMCG industry are positively 
influenced. For the manufacturers a signi­
ficantly negative influence has been observed 
for Phase 2 even at a 1% significance level. 
In this phase, the manufacturers receive 
the information that normally the lowest 
gain share has been assigned to them omit­
ting the fact that they are the smallest 
player in the supply chain. Last information 
was only provided in Phase 3. This informa­
tion increased the acceptance level compared 
to Phase 2; nevertheless, the acceptance 
level of Phase 3 is below the one of Phase 1. 
Un like the manufacturers, the LSPs in the 
Dutch FMCG industry are significantly po­
si tive influenced by available information. 
Unlike the manufacturers and LSPs, for 
the retailers no significant influence of avail­
able information could be identified.
In addition to the influence of the in­
formation availability, for all parties the 
influence of cognitive biases could be iden­
tified. Looking at the manufacturers’ ac­
ceptance levels for the Nucleolus, apart 
from one ma nufacturer who accepted the 
gain share assigned by the Nucleolus in 
Phase 1, the allocation method has been 
rejected by all bu siness practitioners, even 
though the assigned gain share with €4333.33 
is greater compared to the manufactur­
er’s  contribution with –€5000. Therefore, 
Table 8
logistic regression output for the retailers
Coefficient significance level
Intercept –0.296
  (0.742)
0.675
Shapley –0.659
  (0.869)
0.418
WCM­Power –0.659
  (0.869)
0.418
WCM­Initiator –2.830
  (1.552)
0.014
ECM –1.666
  (1.054)
0.075
Phase 2   0.000
  (0.793)
1.000
Phase 3   0.000
  (0.793)
1.000
χ2 = 10.601, df = 6, p­value = 0.000
N o t e: standard errors are in parentheses; statistics marked in bold indicate a significance of the correspond­
ing independent variables.
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an  impact of cognitive biases can be as­
sumed for the business practitioners. The 
manufacturers had to invest the highest 
amount to start the SCC, see Table 2. Taken 
this into account, the manufacturer’s rea­
son for rejecting the gain sharing methods 
might be the small portion of the gain that 
cannot justify the costs and efforts. The 
LSPs in the Dutch FMCG industry show 
the highest acceptance levels. This can be 
explained by the influence of a cognitive 
bias, the so­called choice­sup portive bias 
[Mather, Johnson, 2000]. The LSPs are 
usually the party initiating to start the 
collaboration in the Dutch FMCG industry. 
Therefore, no matter what gain share is 
assigned, the LSPs always show a high ac­
ceptance level. On the contrary, the retail­
ers reveal a very low acceptance level with 
20%. The low acceptance level of the retail­
ers can be explained by the retailer’s high 
contribution to the coalition gain combined 
with a lower gain according to all gain shar­
ing methods, see Table 2 and Table 3. The 
missing influence of information availabil­
ity on the acceptance levels indicate an ad­
ditional influence of cognitive biases. One 
explanation might be the powerful position 
of the retailers in the Dutch FMCG supply 
chain, identified by [Jung, Peeters, Vre de­
veld, 2017]. Taking into account the pow­
er position of the retailers, this party might 
demand a bigger portion of the gain. [Tijs, 
Driessen, 1986] also outline that the choice 
of the method depends on the parties’ pow­
er feeling. The WCM­Power already consid­
ers the party’s power position; the highest 
weight has been assigned to the retailers. 
However, this allocation method revealed 
a low acceptance. Based on this result, it 
is assumed that the weight did not represent 
the retailer’s power in the Dutch FMCG 
industry.
The above­mentioned findings clearly 
show that no party is influenced by available 
information in the same way and that dif­
ferent parties show various cognitive bi­
ases. Due to the different influence of in­
formation availability and varying cognitive 
biases, no allocation method is preferred by 
all collaborative parties. The manufacturers 
preferred the ECM with an acceptance lev­
el of 100%. On the contrary, the retailers 
had a clear preference with 41.67% for the 
Nu cleo lus and the LSPs were indifferent 
between the Shapley value, the WCM­Power 
and the ECM. In addition, only small dif­
ferences between the acceptance levels of 
the gain sharing methods for all parties 
together could be identified and the accep­
tance levels were far from 100%. With an 
acceptance level of 66.67% the business 
practitioners showed a slight preference for 
the ECM. These findings confirm the result 
from literature that no gain sharing meth­
od is preferred by all collaborative parties 
[Tijs, Driessen, 1986] and demonstrate the 
challenge of applying a gain sharing meth­
od that is accepted by all collaborative par­
ties which is, however, essential for the 
implementation and success of a SCC [Cru­
ijssen, Cools, Dullaert, 2007; Cruijssen, 
Dullaert, Fleuren, 2007; Leng, Parlar, 2009; 
Cruijssen, 2012].
4.2. further research
The present research offers several oppor­
tunities for further research. The small 
sample size represents one limitation of the 
quantitative case studies, but is balanced 
by the experiences and the expertise in re­
gard to SCC of the respondent base. Further­
more, the results support statements in the 
literature that there exists no gain sharing 
method which is accepted by all collabora­
tive parties and that decision­makers are 
influenced by available information and cog­
nitive biases. Therefore, it is assumed that 
surveys with a greater sample size, in oth­
er industries and/or geographical areas will 
confirm the findings of this study. Moreover, 
the participants of the online survey were 
confronted with one specific artificial situ­
ation without e. g. monetary incentives. Con­
ducting the online survey in a real­life situ­
ation could identify other important behav­
ioural decision­making aspects.
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Furthermore, additional allocations me­
thods and weights can be considered. In the 
study, four selected allocation methods have 
been tested; further research could also in­
clude gain sharing methods like the EPM 
or the WRSM in the survey. In addition, 
two weights, determined based on inter­
views, were taking into account in the sur­
vey. For the retailer it has been identified 
that the chosen weight for the WCM­Power 
is not representing its power position. Fur­
ther research should, therefore, take into 
account also other important aspects of the 
FMCG industry and/or other industries as 
well as vary the weights assigned to the 
par ties.
Moreover, two behavioural decision­mak­
ing aspects were taken into account and 
debiasing techniques have been proposed. 
Further research could also take into ac­
count other aspects. One example is the 
availability of time, which is another com­
ponent of the bounded rationality mentioned 
by [Si mon, 1979]. The lack of available time 
force people to use heuristics or cognitive 
biases [Schenk, 2011; Simon, 1979], there­
fore, it might be interesting to also include 
the availability of time in future surveys. 
Further more, debiasing techniques should 
be tested in practice. Finally, it could be 
identified that due to the different influence 
of information availability and varying cog­
nitive biases no gain sharing method is ac­
cepted by and satisfies all collaborative par­
ties. Further allocation methods focusing 
on the parties’ acceptance of and satisfac­
tion with the assigned gain share might be 
one option to deal with the outlined prob­
lem.
5. ConClusion
SCC is used in many industries to gain com­
petitive advantages. However, next to ad­
vantages, SCCs bring along challenges. In 
this paper, the focus was on the challenge 
of dividing the coalition gain among the 
collaborative parties. To increase the will­
ingness of parties to join further SCCs and 
for the success of SCCs, it is important that 
every party is satisfied with and accepts 
the assigned amount of the coalition gain. 
The present paper investigated the accep­
tance levels of selected gain sharing meth­
ods in practice and is an extension of [Cru­
ijssen, Cools, Dullaert, 2007; Leng, Parlar, 
2009]. In [Cruijssen, Cools, Dullaert, 2007] 
authors identified the need for a fair gain 
allocation for the implementation and suc­
cess of horizontal SCCs. In the context of 
vertical collaborations, [Leng, Parlar, 2009] 
confirmed the importance of a fair alloca­
tion method for parties to stay in the SCC. 
Although the acceptance of and satisfaction 
with a gain sharing method is necessary for 
a sustainable collaboration, until now the 
acceptance of these gain sharing methods 
in practice has not been examined. This pa­
per filled this gap and enriches the SCM 
literature through the investigation of the 
acceptance levels of selected gain sharing 
methods in vertical three­echelon SCCs in 
the Dutch FMCG industry.
Another contribution to the SCM litera­
ture is the integration of behavioural deci­
sion­making literature. The predominant 
assumption for a long time was that deci­
sion­makers are rational thinking agents. 
How ever, decision­makers are human beings 
and therefore, their decisions are influ­
enced by the bounded rationality and cogni­
tive biases [Simon, 1979; Sterman, 1989; 
Schenk, 2011]. To ensure practical validity, 
it is ne cessary to incorporate behavioural 
research in studies [Tokar, 2010]. In this 
paper, two behavioural aspects, the infor­
mation availability and cognitive biases, 
were taken in to account and, therefore, 
novel insights in the understanding of the 
acceptance of the allocation methods are 
provided.
Results showed that providing the same 
information to all collaborative parties in 
the Dutch FMCG industry would lead to no 
preferred allocation method. As stated by 
[Cruijssen, Cools, Dullaert, 2007], a gain 
sharing method which is perceived as fair 
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and is accepted by all collaborative parties 
is crucial for the implementation and suc­
cess of the SCC. Therefore, one practical 
implication to overcome the barrier is to 
provide all relevant information to each 
party individually. Furthermore, differenc­
es between the different parties indicated 
the influence of various cognitive biases. 
Cognitive biases influence our rational be­
haviour resulting in unpredictable decisions 
[Schenk, 2011]. Therefore, in order to in­
crease the predictability of the behaviour, 
one idea based on the research by [Soll, 
Milk man, Payne, 2015] is to apply so­called 
de biasing­techniques. One possible debias­
ing­technique is to provide all relevant in­
formation packaged in an intuitively com­
prehensible and compelling format.
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Appendix A
The preliminary study consisted of 20 companies 
including 7 manufacturers, 6 LSPs and 7 retail­
ers from the Dutch FMCG industry. All compa­
nies were also participating in the logistics com­
petition, which is observed in this paper. For 
the data collection individual, semi­structured 
interviews were conducted mostly face­to­face 
with the supply chain managers from the com­
panies. The following questions concerning the 
gain sharing methods were asked to the inter­
viewees:
•	 What does “fair gain sharing” mean for you 
and your company?
•	 To what extend are you willing to share gains 
among the entire supply chain? (Answer on 
a 5­point Likert scale.)
•	 Would it be a problem for your company to 
share gains that are captured by your com­
pany, but are a result of a collaboration proj­
ect with other parties involved? To what ex­
tend and why?
•	 If so, why are you willing to share gains? 
Mention your top 5.
•	 In your experience, how do other parties within 
your project/supply chain react to gain sharing?
•	 Before you start a collaboration project, is the 
transparency of how much each party needs to 
invest in collaboration projects an important 
issue?
•	  Before you are staring a collaboration project, 
is it crucial information for you to know how 
parties will benefit? To what extend and why?
Appendix B
In the following an example of the online survey 
is presented. This is an online survey for a par­
ticipant party A, the manufacturer (Fig. 8–9).
Fig. 10 to Fig. 12 show examples for the part 
of the online survey belonging to Phase 1. In 
Fig. 12 an example for the question in Phase 1 is 
shown. In the online survey in total five questions 
were asked; one for each gain sharing method.
Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 show examples for the part 
of the online survey belonging to Phase 2. In 
Fig. 14 an example for the question in Phase 2 
is shown. In the online survey in total five ques­
tions were asked; one for each gain sharing 
method.
Fig. 15 to Fig. 17 show examples for the part 
of the online survey belonging to Phase 3. In 
Fig. 17 an example for the question in Phase 3 
is shown. In the online survey in total five ques­
tions were asked; one for each gain sharing 
method.
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Fig. 8. Example of the online survey
Fig. 9. Example of the online survey
Fig. 10. Example of the online survey
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Fig. 11. Example of the online survey
Fig. 12. Example of the online survey
Fig. 13. Example of the online survey
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Fig. 14. Example of the online survey
Fig. 15. Example of the online survey
Fig. 16. Example of the online survey
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Fig. 17. Example of the online survey
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В последние десятилетия из­за постоянно растущей конкуренции среди организаций и все 
более высоких ожиданий клиентов компании стали осознавать необходимость сотрудниче­
ства в цепях поставок. Однако формирование коалиции зачастую становится вызовом для 
ее участников. Одной из наиболее серьезных проблем для функционирования и успешности 
коалиции является честный метод распределения выгод, признаваемый всеми ее участни­
ками и удовлетворяющий их. Несмотря на то что исследователи уже продемонстрировали 
важность одобрения сторонами метода раздела выгод, до сих пор фактический уровень 
одобрения таких методов участниками цепей поставок не становился предметом анализа. 
Авторы статьи стремятся заполнить этот пробел в рамках исследования уровней одобрения 
нескольких выбранных методов раздела выгод на примере вертикальных трехуровневых 
цепей поставок в сфере товаров повседневного спроса в Дании. В работе также рассматри­
вается воздействие поведенческих аспектов принятия решений на уровень согласия с ме­
тодами раздела выгод — с целью объяснения причин принятия или непринятия опреде­
ленного метода. Результаты анализа демонстрируют, что одобрение метода раздела выгод 
зависит от доступности информации и когнитивных предубеждений (biases). Кроме того, 
в связи с разным влиянием доступной информации и переменных когнитивных предубеж­
дений ни один метод распределения выгод не одобряется сразу всеми сторонами, сотрудни­
чающими в цепи поставок. Что касается практического применения полученных результатов, 
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то можно рекомендовать предоставлять индивидуально каждому участнику всю существен­
ную информацию для повышения уровня одобрения метода раздела выгод всеми сторонами, 
а также использовать подходы, позволяющие снижать уровень когнитивных предубеждений, 
чтобы сделать принимаемые участниками цепи поставок решения более предсказуемыми.
Ключевые слова: сотрудничество в цепи поставок, раздел выгод, поведенческое принятие 
решений.
JEL: C71, D61, L80.
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